mental degradation;3 the rapid infusion and withdrawal of short-term funds, which endangers the financial stability of even the largest economies; tax avoidance; the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction; genocide; cybercrime;4 and the difficulty of regulating multinational corporations.
Second, the rise in transnational problems is prima-facie evidence that the existing system, which is centered around nation states and their representatives (either in intergovernmental endeavors or in international organizations), is not sufficiently effective. Indeed, nations' capacity to control their own affairs is declining, a point raised by the critics of globalization and recognized by its champions. To provide but one illustration: nations that object to material communicated over the Internet (e.g. violent material, pornography, and Nazi propaganda) have great difficulties in upholding policies that ban such material, which they previously were able to enforce.s When these nations seek to collaborate, they run into the problems the intergovernmental system (from here on, the 'old system') poses.
The old system is largely driven by intergovernmental agreements and projects (conducted by two or more governments) or international organizations governed by representatives of national governments, such as the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organization. The old system is unable to handle a high volume of significant activities because decision-makers must consult with their respective governments on most matters before they can proceed (or are instructed in great detail ahead of time, which greatly limits their maneuverability). Also, when it comes to global or even semi-global policies, so many different nations are involved, with divergent interests and values, that decisions are hard to reach. Exceptions include matters of relatively limited import and of clear value to all parties -postal arrangements, for instance, and arguably trade. However, on numerous other matters, progress is slow (compared to the pace of the increase in problems) and nations much more often agree upon declarations than they actually implement them.
Given the rise in transnational problems and the inadequacy of the old system, what post-200I global architectures might prove to be more effective and yet legitimate? What implications does the anti-terrorism coalition have for such architectures? As the article deals with alternative futures, it is by necessity theoretical and somewhat speculative.
The 2001 American Anti-Terrorism Coalition: A Characterization
It should be noted that the examination is limited to the first three months of the coalition's existence, as these lines are written in mid-December 2001. Usually such a short period would not justify an analysis. However, even if the coalition vanished immediately, its special nature would warrant consideration. Moreover, 0 as will become clear, there are reasons to expect that similar coalitions might arise in the future.
The coalition is significantly more global than many if not all coalitions that preceded it, including those of the Korean War, the Gulf War, and peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo (where NATO and Russia collaborated in SFOR and KFOR). It is, of course, more inclusive than the Allied Forces of the SecondWorld War and much more global than the western alliance that was fonned to counter communism during the cold war.
The scope of the coalition can be measured in two ways. One is fairly mechanical -simply comparing the number of nations that have agreed to participate or have actually made some contributions to its efforts to the number that have not. By this measure, almost all the nations of the world, including those that previously supported terrorists, such as Sudan, Iran and Yemen, have agreed to participate and have made actual contributions to the work of the coalition. For instance, Sudan has provided the United States with intelligence about terrorists. 6 Iran reportedly has recalled 700 intelligence agents and advisers from Lebanon, Sudan and Bosnia, where they were accused of aiding terrorist groupS. 7 Yemen previously refused to cooperate with the United States in the investigation of the bombing of the USS Cole, but since I I September has 'opened its files' to the United States, providing documents that shed new light on the bombing.8 Fifty nations, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, have arrested suspected terrorists at the behest of the United States, often working closely with the CIA.9 Turkey has supplied troops for the fight against the Taliban, and Indonesia has offered to contribute troopS.l0 Pakistan, once a major source of support for theTaliban, has provided much help to the coalition. The scope of the coalition can also be assessed by its support among the most powerful countries; it has gained substantial and not merely nominal support from all the big powers, including Russia and China. Japan has committed noncombat troops and resources to assist the campaign. Although the campaign's military aspect is taking place outside NATO territory, NATO invoked very early on the article in its charter that stipulates that an attack against one member is an attack against all members.
One may argue that there have been numerous other situations in which global bodies such as the United Nations or conferences on issues such as the environment and human rights have reached unanimous resolutions. However, a major reason why such resolutions are so widely endorsed is that national governments know that the resolutions will be largely if not completely unenforced. When they have had the potential for more of a bite, it has been much more difficult to gain universal endorsement. For instance, only 46 countries have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Like all the other coalitions cited, the anti-terrorism coalition has been com-posed and led (fostered would also be an appropriate tenn) by the United States. As in all the others, it has used a mixture of diplomacy, nonnative appeals to the II peoples of the world's nations, covert operations, and the promise of econolnic aid and loans or the threat of withholding these, to form and sustain the coalition.11 However, the anti-terrorism coalition has also engaged significant national interests of many nations, including key coalition members. (Reference is to national interests as perceived by the governments of these nations.) Russia has been seeking approval for its fight against Muslim insurgents in Chechnya whom it considers terrorists. China is concerned about Islamic radicals in its Xinjiang region. Egypt is among the score or more of nations that are struggling to keep radical Islalnic groups that resort to means of violence -terrorists, to these regimes -under control. The Philippines consistently faces violence from two radical Islamic groups. Malaysian and Indonesian Islalnic political groups are generally not militant, but there are some militant groups in these countries that aim to create Islalnic governments.12 India and Sri Lanka are also threatened by lnilitant Islalnic groups. An unusual feature of the coalition is that it is composed of states fighting largely non-state actors (albeit supported by a few states) -terrorist networks with 'global reach',13 said to be active in some 60 countries. This feature is of special interest for two reasons. First, previous coalitions were composed of some nations vying with other nations, which by definition makes it impossible for all of the world's governments to be on one side and thereby constitute a fully global coalition. Second, other pressing transnational problems also involve contests between national governments and non-state actors, such as drug cartels, traffickers in people, and polluting multinational corporations. As a result, some lessons lnight be gleaned from this coalition for dealing with these other transnational challenges. (It lnight be noted in passing that in numerous scholars' recent writings, non-state actors are treated almost exclusively positively, as actors who assist in the building of a global civil society. The discussion here focuses on non-state actors who are agents of disorder and conflict.)
Another distinct feature of the coalition has been the speed and scope of changes in domestic laws and policies it has engendered in several nations. There is a natural tendency to think about the treatment of transnational problems as involving international actions. Meetings at the United Nations, at NATO headquarters, in Geneva, and so on, although they occur within the space and jurisdiction of some nations, are, of course, meant to result in intergovernmental resolutions. Implementation then typically involves several national forces acting in another nation's space, such as Korea or Kosovo.
This has held true for the anti-terrorism coalition as well. However, members have made several significant and especially rapid and synchronized changes in domestic laws and policies in their own countries. These measures concern the balance between public safety and health (regarding protection from bioterrorism) and individual rights. Changes have been particularly drastic in the United States, where scores of new laws and regulations have been introduced. 12
Whether they are excessive or deficient, whether the government was already
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The American Anti-Terrorism Coalition inclined to abuse its powers and violate rights or greater governmental powers have long been needed, is the subject of great differences of opinion. However, nobody questions that relevant American laws have been changed quickly and considerably. Significant changes have also been introduced in many other countries. The European Union introduced a community-wide arrest warrant.14 Germany tightened its surveillance and immigration laws.1S Britain expanded its anti-terrorism act.16 France adopted a law that provides the police greater search powers. 17 The Indian government has placed before India's parliament an ordinance that would give the police sweeping new powers.18 It is particularly relevant to the student of the ways nations may cope with rising transnational problems that these changes have occurred in a semi-coordinated fashion in several nations more or less simultaneously. Finally, the coalition differs from several others in that, although it is an ad hoc and temporary one, it has set some relatively longer range goals. Unlike war-based coalitions, which are expected from the outset to disband once the war is won (e.g. in Korea, the Gulf, and Kosovo), the anti-terrorism coalition is built around the notion that the problem it tackles is complex and lasting and requires a longer run, global drive. There is no way to predict the future of the coalition; indeed, it may well have fallen apart by the time these lines are read, or may have greatly metamorphosed. It should be noted, though, that its stated aim was not to catch bin Laden or overthrow the Taliban, but to eradicate terrorist cells in some 60 countries. An approximate meeting of this goal will require some continuation of the coalition.
What Kind of Architecture is the Coalition?
The discussion now turns to characterization of the coalition in analytical terms. If it were completely US-dominated, and most if not all the nations participated because they were pressured or threatened by the United States, and if it were lasting and broader in scope, it might be characterized as an empire, albeit a temporary one. Empires are defined as entities in which one member has a considerable amount of controlling power over the member-units. 19 Because membership in empires is not usually voluntary, and responsiveness to the needs of member-units is low, empires rely (by the definition followed here) relatively little on legitimation and draw much more on 'naked' power. Only a very few call for the United States to impose on its own a Pax Americana, the way Rome did on its world}O Given that several big powers have a strong measure of self-interest in participating in the anti-terrorism coalition (granted that many actions, domestic and international, are driven by mixed motives), as do numerous smaller powers; given the coalition's limited scope and duration; and given that the United States has limited power over the many members of the coalition, one might refer to the coalition as a semi-empire. 13 
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Just as some may claim that 'semi' is too weak a temI, others may argue that suggesting that the coalition has even an element of empire in it is too strong. However, the temI seems justified because the United States is fostering a new world order, one in which terrorism will be actively suppressed in some 60 countries on four continents. It seeks the cooperation of numerous nations, but those who do not cooperate (e.g. Iraq) will be subject to pressure, including the means of warfare (as the Taliban have been in Mghanistan). Moreover, the coalition, but mainly the United States, is seeking to determine what kinds of national governments are to follow uncooperative regimes (e.g. in Mghanistan). Also, the United States actively promotes, through the CIA and other means, governments that support its policies and hold at bay their opposition (e.g. in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan). This is clearly a far cry from the global 'directorate' that some have suggested as a possible foundation for a new global order, which would be composed of a partnership of several big powers, more or less equal in their roles and power}! (Granted, some steps in this direction can be seen in recent plans to fomI a NATO of 20, or to include Russia in some of its decision-making -and not merely nominally -and in suggestions to restructure the UN Security Council to include Japan.)
One major attribute of the semi-empire at issue is that its scope (measured by the number of important transnational problems it tackles) is thin}2 Although the anti-terrorism coalition is nearly global in its level of participation and the reach of its effects, it is narrowly crafted. At least, its stated missions are limited to stopping terrorism. Whatever legitimacy this semi-empire has acquired, which it needs in order not to rely only on its power base, is largely due to its narrowly constructed mission. Governments, opinion-makers, and citizens who strongly disagree about other matters and missions may recognize some merit in nations acting outside their borders, seeking to protect themselves from transnational terrorism. (This might be referred to as 'face legitimacy' which is based on the intrinsic merits of the action rather than on the ways the decisions to engage in it are reached.)
At the core of the semi-empire are nation states. No fomIation of a new kind of international body nor any fomIal surrender of sovereignty is involved. The difficulties involved in many governments making many joint decisions are here avoided by either the United States making most of them or by leaving them up to each nation -following pressure, encouragement, or other fomIS of inducement by the United States or other strong members of the coalition. This contrasts sharply with the procedures used in the first stages of the war in Kosovo, in which each bombing target had to be approved by a 19-nation committeetypical of the old system}3
International relations scholars compare unilateral and multilateral actions. It is often suggested that multilateral action is more cumbersome and in that sense less efficient than unilateral action, but at the same time more legitimate because 14 the parties involved have been consulted and have concurred on the course of action to be followed. In these tenns, the anti-terrorism coalition might be characterized as unilateralism-plus (the plus refers to limited consultation with coalition members and some attention to their considerations and sensibilities).
In line with this analysis, one finds that, so far, the coalition has been rather effective but the legitimacy of its actions has been largely provided by its goals and has not by the ways decisions are made or the specific means that are being employed (e.g. extensive bombing, military tribunals, and targeted assassinations of leaders).
Limited Futures
Given that the world is plagued by a large variety of transnational problemsbeyond terrorism, the question arises whether a global architecture might arise that is much broader (in terms of the problems addressed) and more legitimate than the American anti-terrorism coalition.
'Mission Creep'
A new global system might develop out of the American anti-terrorism coalition if it deliberately, or without full prior consideration, gradually expanded its missions. First steps in such a direction are evident in the movement toward 'nation building' in Mghanistan (that is, working to ensure that a country will not break into tribal war and that a united government will be formed, and generally helping it become a more integrated nation). This is taking hold even though, initially, the mission was to be limited to uprooting the Taliban and the terrorists and nation building was strongly opposed}4 Coalition forces are being sent to Mghanistan, although both the Taliban and the terrorists have been largely banished, adding peacekeeping to the mission list. Also, some steps, albeit very small ones, are being taken to provide for economic and political development (some are even calling for a Marshall Plan25). A similar expansion of missions took place in the coalitions that acted in Kosovo and Bosnia, which were early and limited precursors to the 2001 coalition. Moreover, any expanded mission would likely propel further expansion because it is difficult to complete a mission without taking on additional tasks. As often noted, if a country such as Mghanistan is left in the same state of destruction and anarchy that led it to welcome the Taliban in the first place, it is likely soon to become a fertile ground for terrorists again -hence the call for at least some measure of nation building and economic reconstruction.
A much more significant candidate for mission expansion is for the coalition to act to limit the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and by rogue states. This is an issue of particular interest to the United States, but other big powers and many small ones are also concerned that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction may fall into the wrong hands}6 The 15 immediate concern is that terrorists might acquire such weapons, which would allow them to blackmail a big power or actually employ them, as bin Laden has openly threatened to do. Closely related is the fear that states may employ them against one another, such as India and Pakistan, or Iraq and Israel, or even one of these states against a superpower. Some of us have been warning about this danger for 40 years. However, the danger has become much more acute as the threat from terrorists has been added to that from rogue states, as the weapons have become miniaturized (to suitcase, vial, or envelope size), and as control over them has weakened following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, there seems to be specific evidence that the terrorists have been actively seeking, possibly even successfully, to acquire or build such weapons.
True, the big powers do not all have the same stake in this issue. The United States is much more concerned about being attacked than, say, China. However, other countries may be concerned that, if terrorists use such weapons to blackmail or attack another big power, they may be the next one under the gun as all major powers are vying with terrorists and terrorists have been shown to help one another. Also, these nations fear that if the United States made a major investment in an anti-ballistic missile defense, which they would be hard put to match, they could be subject to a unilateral attack by the United States.
Such a mission to curb the threat of weapons of mass destruction would entail numerous steps, including banning the sale of certain materials on the international market, which would be enforced by the coalition (somewhat in the way the United States has in the past pressured Russia and China not to sell missiles and plutonium to countries such as Iran and Iraq); paying laboratories and scientists trained in the production of weapons of mass destruction to engage in other activities;27 and systematically pressuring nations to give up such weapons and allow inspection to verify that they do not possess or produce them. (Reference is to all but the big powers, although they, too, would scale back their production and stockpiles. They already allow some international inspection. The, at least initial, exclusion of big powers from the envisioned global requirements to destroy weapons of mass destruction is not based on a conception of justice or fairness, but on the fact that they are not currendy considered the main threat and that it is impractical at this stage to expect them to submit to such a regime.)
The main difference between past efforts to the same effect and the ones the coalition may be drawn into is the much larger scale and scope of the endeavor and an increased willingness of the United States and some other nations to use military force to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, beginning with Iraq.
As control of weapons of mass destruction is a continuous rather than a temporary task, a major feature of the expanded coalition would be its lasting, standing rather than transient, nature. It would likely lead to further mission expansion. If 16 the coalition were going to impose effectively a ban on the production of weapons
The American Anti-Terrorimz Coalition of mass destruction, it would have to field peacekeeping forces to guarantee the borders of small nations that face large conventional forces (such as Israel). To be effective, such forces could not be assembled ad hoc over the course of months (as was the case when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq) because small nations might be wiped out in short order. Hence, the mission expansion or creep would tend to favor positioning peacekeeping forces ahead of time in various parts of the world and storing there military assets for larger, backup forces. Expansion to include still other missions related to order can also be envisioned. These could include tackling cybercrime, transnational drug smuggling (beginning with the opium smuggled out of Mghanistan), and trafficking in people, especially sex slaves. Another major direction in which the coalition might expand (as it metamorphoses) would be to add humanitarian interventions, the demand for which has been increasing in recent years}8
The United States has experienced a major change in its orientation toward international affairs, which needs to be mentioned here because, as the kingpin of the coalition, changes in its orientation are particularly significant. The 2001 campaign in Mghanistan has completed a process that started during the 199 I war in the Persian Gulf and continued in the subsequent campaign in Kosovo: it did not merely erase the Vietnam complex, but reversed it. Vietnam left the United States with many casualties, huge public dissent, and a failed mission, reinforcing strong, existing isolationist tendencies. The development of new technologies of war has allowed the United States to win the three recent campaigns, with next to no casualties, gaining wide public acclaim in the United States. These repeated successes have not only laid to rest the Vietnam complex but have greatly whetted the United States' appetite for international actions. The United States seems more inclined now to expand its overseas missions than it was previously, not merely in response to terrorism but also because of the changes in the technology of warfare and in it.s international orientation. It has moved again from semi-isolationism to interventionism.
With every expansion, the difficulties the coalition is most likely to face are those that would result from the inadequacy of its mechanisms for working out differences in the values and interests of the governments involved and of their citizens. The whole point of a semi-empire is that it makes short shrift of such consensus building because it relies to some extent on the face legitimacy of its mission -and on its ability to enforce its choices. However, the face legitimacy of several of the missions listed is much smaller than combating terrorism; the means used -say, in combating cyberpiracy or the illegal flow of people -are viewed very differently by different governments and peoples. Hence, it is safe to suggest that the more transnational problems the coalition took on, the more opposition it would evoke.
The difficulties would likely multiply if the coalition were somehow to turn to non-order-related issues, such as significantly increasing the enforcement of human rights or environmental protection, not to mention significant cross-
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what the United States' government and many of its citizens consider to be their interests and values. In addition, on such issues other members of the coalition have sharply conflicting values and interests, much more so than in matters concerning order, although here, too, the amount of conflicts is far from small. Regarding wealth, the difference between the 'have' nations (often, the power-wielders) and the 'have-nots' is particularly substantial. Also, in dealing with these non-order-related missions, the main objects of transnational policies would be nation states rather than non-state actors, which would, on the face of it, seem to undercut the possibility of a global coalition. (This does not mean that current operations under the United Nations, UNICEF, the World Bank, and many other international bodies such as the Red Cross, as well as national efforts such as peace corps, could not be continued or even expanded. These bodies, though, do not amount to a new world architecture and have not proven capable of coping on their own with the rising transnational problems}9) In summary, mission creep may occur, especially regarding select orderrelated issues. However, the more missions are added, the more exacerbated problems of legitimacy will become due to strongly divergent values and interests and the absence of mechanisms to work out disagreements, given the coalition's semi-empire nature. It is particularly difficult to imagine the coalition being expanded to deal with transnational problems not concerning order, especially social justice. The search hence turns to the possibility of architectures that could both deal effectively with a broad array of transnational problems, including non-order-related ones, and generate much more legitimacy than the semiempire is able to marshal.
Multiple Mono-Functional, Transnational Agencies
Another possible scenario, also grafted onto the old system, is that, in response to the pressure of increasing transnational problems, several thin transnational agencies could develop, each dedicated to one mission, that would each resemble the anti-terrorism coalition in the scope of its mission but be much less hierarchical. One transnational agency might seek to deal with the international environment, one with global public health issues, and so on.
Such an architecture has been called functionalist.3O As described by AnneMarie Slaughter;! each agency would be composed of networks of those , national officials who work for the agencies dealing with the same missions in their countries. These officials would acquire or be granted considerable latitude so that they would not have to consult too closely with their national governments or be instructed by them about details. As a result, these agencies would be able to do much more than heretofore has been accomplished by typical intergovernmental bodies or international organizations.
Such functional transnational agencies would be an extension of informal networks that are said already to exist among government officials who serve in the same field and get to know each other personally, and reportedly seek to cooperate above and beyond their instructions}2 Examples given by Slaughter include the Basle Committee of Central Bankers and cooperation between the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the EU's European Commission. 33 In considering the possible effectiveness of such agencies, one notes that they face several serious difficulties. As long as nations maintain their sovereignty, they are likely to be disinclined to allow their representatives to work out transnational agreements and arrangements without elaborate prior instructions and continuous consultation. Otherwise, the results may well be outside the consensus worked out in domestic politics and in the institutions to which the executive branches of national governments are accountable, especially legislatures. As long as the license given to the officials involved is limited, there is not much that such transnational agencies can accomplish above and beyond garden variety intergovernmental endeavors.
Moreover, the less hierarchy there is among the nations involved (this being the main difference between the envisioned transnational agencies and the antiterrorism coalition), the more difficult it will be for nations to follow a joint, coherent policy. In a thin semi-empire, the dominant nation (or nations) can set the course. Others either find it in .line with their national goals or are offered incentives or pressured to fall in line. However, the more equal the participants become in their say over the decision-making concerning the shared course, the more national instruction and consultation is required, and the more difficult it is to set a course of action. (At issue is not merely that the process of instruction is slow and cumbersome and cannot bear much added traffic, but the values and interests of different nations are often incompatible. This may be true in a semiempire as well, but in a semi-empire less powerful countries are pushed into acting partially against their values and interests.) The limits of the functional approach are reflected in the examples provided by Slaughter of transnational informal networks that might be seen as forerunners of the transnational agencies. These networks either involve few nations or deal with rather few and thin issues.
In short, although grafted onto the old system, either an expanded version of the anti-terrorism coalition or transnational agencies could provide more horsepower for coping with transnational problems. However, their capacity is expected to be limited by two factors: lack of legitimacy (especially in the case of the coalition) and the need to involve myriad national governments (particularly in the case of transnational agencies). The mind hence turns to examine whether there have been recent developments that point to types of architecture not based on the old system, and whether they might be more effective and command a higher level of legitimacy than the grafted-on designs explored so far. 19 Steps Toward Global Crowning
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The American Anti-Terrorism Coalition franca,36 and greater economic links. Third, as has long been argued, the world might unite if it faced a worldwide threat that amounted to 'the moral equivalent of war'j37 the current threat of terrorism may qualify as such a threat. Thus, oddly, as international relations theory has increasingly taken it for granted that even thin forms of world government and society are utopian, conditions have arisen that may make moving in this direction possible. The discussion turns to examine developments that lay the foundations for architectures that would be more effective and legitimate than the old system, or the anti-terrorism coalition or thin transnational agencies grafted onto the old system.
Supranational Decision-Making
Supranational decision-making provides a degree of crowning. Some supranational institutions have recently been developed on the regional and even the semi-global level, albeit to a much more limited extent. One element of supranational decision-making is that decisions are reached by a governing body not composed of national representatives, a body that follows its own rules, policies, and values rather than being instructed by national governments. This often allows supranational bodies to move with more agility and speed and more broadly than decision-making bodies based on the old system.
Another element is that the nations encompassed by supranational entities -as well as their citizens and member-units, such as corporations and labor unionsare expected to follow the rulings of these bodies (rather than their requiring approval by the national governments whose people are affected, as is the case in the old system). In addition, supranational bodies may have some kind of effective enforcement capacity of their own, such as the ability to fine corporations within the member states directly or to order them to desist from some action rather than fining the governments or asking them to rein in the corporations. That is, supranational bodies have more power than traditional intergovernmental entities; indeed, supranationality presumes some surrender of sovereignty by the member nations.
The development of supranational decision-making in the European Union is well known and provides by far the strongest illustration of such an approach to date. Among the semi-global institutions that have some features of supranationality are two courts (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda),38 the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),39 the World Trade Organization (WTO),40 and non-state bodies that provide transnational commercial arbitration, such as the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration. 41 Supranational decision-making, to the extent that it has been allowed to work, seems to have lived up to the expectation that it can handle a higher volume of 21 work than the old system (a point not documented here). However, it faces in all cases the same criticism: it is imposed, unaccountable, and undemocratic. 42 The reason is elementary: supranational bodies acquire some of the powers of national governments, but are not equally accountable to legislatures. ('Equal' is used because the EU Commission is accountable to the EU Parliament in some ways, but the EU Parliament is weaker than national parliaments.) Also, existing supranational bodies on the regional level, let alone on the global level, cannot draw on the Durkheimian qualities nations provide. The question then follows whether it is possible to transfer some national features (a community invested in a state, a common identity) to supranational bodies. Supranational decisionmaking per se is thus found to be an effective and potentially important building block of a new global architecture, but the rest of the building is missing.
Regional Communities as Intermediary Steps and Organizational Levels
A direct transition from the old system -which contains some 200 nation states and an even larger number of communities -to a global state and society is hard to imagine, let alone bring about. For reasons spelled out elsewhere,43 there is good reason to believe that if a global state and society ever did develop, they would be preceded by and based on regional groupings that would integrate several nations into a community and state (as some envision the European Union will do). Briefly, the reason for this is that consensus building becomes overloaded when large numbers of participants are involved, especially if there are significant differences in values and interests among them. Digesting some of the differences first within small groups, and then fashioning consensus among their representatives, is more workable. (One can even imagine three levels, the way local, state, and federal government works -having regional and interregional communities as stepping stones to a global one.)
Some have argued that the recent formation of regional communities such as the European Union may hinder the formation of a world government and society. It should be granted that this could be the case, especially if regional communities were formed on the basis of antagonism to other communities. However, there is no a priori reason that such antagonism must develop. (For instance, although the growth of the European Union has caused some minor tensions with NAFTA, it has caused no serious conflicts with the United States, Canada, and Mexico in international organizations such as the United Nations.) In effect, the opposite seems to be the case. Instead of having to negotiate with 15 (or 27) European countries, on numerous issues other countries and regional associations now can increasingly deal with one representative.
If more and more nations formed a number of regional bodies -a United States of Europe, a Union of Latin American States, of Southeast Asia, and so on -interactions among these communities would likely be significantly more Etzioni 
formation of ilie European Union itself benefited from ilie coming togeilier of two blocs -ilie inner six and ilie outer seven -as well as from ilie pre-existent bonds among ilie Benelux countries.)
One can even imagine iliat ilie development of regional communities would be followed by supraregional blocs, as anoilier intermediary step on ilie way to a global architecture. The Council of Europe acts to some extent in iliis way, encompassing boili ilie European Union and eastern Europe (former members of ilie Warsaw bloc). Under this scenario, for example, a North American alliance might form a Western Hemispheric supraregional bloc wiili Souili America. These, ilien, might one day be incorporated into a global society and government. In contemplating such visions it is important to recall ilie obvious: as of now, iliere are only a few, wiili ilie exception of ilie European Union, very weak regional communities.
Regional communities are based on much more encompassing types of architecture ilian supranational decision-making, which is merely one feature of regional communities. To ilie extent iliat iliey develop legislative bodies, cabinets, and oilier accountability mechanisms, as well as values and bonds shared across national borders, iliey can boili be more effective ilian ilie old system in dealing wiili transnational problems and gain in legitimacy. However, by definition, iliey deal wiili ilie problems of one region or anoilier. Many rising problems, iliough, are global, and it is at iliis level iliat iliey will eventually have to be treated if iliey are to be dealt wiili effectively. The discussion hence turns to examine iliree alternative global railier ilian regional architectures iliat could develop in ilie world following ilie anti-terrorism coalition or as an outgrowth of it. The discussion proceeds by necessity in broad strokes because it focuses merely on a few select features of iliese designs. As ilie discussion deals wiili alternative futures, it is inevitably highly speculative and tests ilie extent of license ilie reader is willing to grant to ilie auilior.
Alternative Future Global Architectures A Global Nation: The Whole Nine Yards With time, measured in generations rather than years, one can envision a world of, say, 20 regional communities, further grouped into six supraregional ones, being crowned by a global government and civil society. It would have many of the features of a nation, which is often defined as a community ensconced in a state. That is, the evolving architecture would not merely have the powers of a state but also a core of shared values and would command a measure of loyalty from the world's citizens. These features are essential if what may be called a 'global nation' is to be able to contain conflict and legitimately impose burdens 23 European Journal of Political Theory I (I) on some parts of the citizenry for the benefit of others, as happens, for example, when wealth is reallocated. (The term 'global nation' is justified because it suggests that the global state would have to command some of the loyalty and possess some of the political legitimacy and value endorsement now commanded by nation states.)
Several scholars see some indication that the world has been moving in the direction of a global society, however long the journey. The development since 1989 of a very large number of international non-governmental organizations (I-NGOs), transnational networks, and transnational social movements44 is widely considered to be laying the foundations for such a society. 45 The developing global society is said to be able to carry out some of the duties that would otherwise remain unmet, absent a world government (this notion is captured by the phrase 'governance without government').46 A highly regarded scholar, Lawrence Lessig, believes that we are approaching the formation of a global society. He compares the development of American identity in the 19th century to the development of a world identity today, referring to Daniel Webster's pronouncement that he spoke not as a man from Massachusetts or the North, but as an American, which heralded the birth of anew, primary identity:
We stand today just a few years before where Webster stood in 1850. We stand on the brink of being able to say, 'I speak as a citizen of the world,' without the ordinary person thinking, 'What a nut. '47 Others have pointed to the rise of transnational nonns, laws, and courts to suggest that the rising global civil society is laying the foundations for a global state. 48 The growing worldwide respect for the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also cited in this context.49 Although all of these observations seem valid, few expect a global nation to develop in short order. This necessitates looking for other global architectures that might be put in place much more rapidly.
A Constitutional
Assembly: Jumping Forward
Just as some favored transitioning from Soviet socialism to capitalism and democracy in Russia over two years rather than waiting for a gradual transition, there are those who favor moving rapidly by first forming a global state (rather than waiting for the development of a global society) through a legislative feat. In this plan, a world government would gain legitimacy not from being the organic expression of an evolving world society, but from the process by which the government would be constituted and from its democratic procedures. The United World Federalists are among those who have taken this position.5o Champions of a much transformed United Nations have developed similarmodels. 51 An often evoked image in this context is that of the American Constitutional Convention -that is. all the nations of the world would oarticioate in 24 Etzioni: The American Anti-Terrorirm Coalition fonningthe world government and would endorse the constitution fonnulated by a world assembly.
This architecture would include an executive branch that would be accountable to a world legislature (and, presumably, through it to the 'citizens of the world'),52 which is an essential prerequisite for legitimacy, especially for a government engaged in a broad array of activities, including many non-orderrelated ones. A broad agenda would be likely because if the nations of the world were going to agree to be subject to a world government, various issues they consider important would have to be addressed. Because it is high on the list of concerns of many nations and people, topping the list of issues would likely be the reallocation of wealth between the haves and the have-nots -that is, issues of social justice. (Many specific issues now often discussed reflect this underlying matter, including loan forgiveness to poor nations, providing drugs either free or below market cost to developing nations, changing the tenns of trade, and much else.)
If a world government could be constructed that dealt with a broad array of issues, in ways that at least the majority of the people (or nations) of the world found in line with their values and interests, and if it were the result of a voluntary coming together of nations (rather than being imposed by some superpower or directorate of big powers), it would likely be effective and might be considered legitimate. However, very few students of international affairs find such a development plausible, most certainly not in the short tenn. The Durkheimian assumptions mentioned suggest that a sense of community must precede a constitutional assembly. True, the European Union has recently agreed to call a constitutional convention in 2002, but only after two generations of community building, and it encompasses only 15 nations.
A Gradualist Approach: Building on the Semi-Empire Surely one can envision all kinds of still other global architectures; indeed, many have. However, these are typically either narrow in the scope of the transnational problems they aim to handle, or their requirements can only be met in the long term, leaving us with a high volume of pressing transnational problems largelyuntreated.
Some envisioned. courses of action are add-ons to the old, intergovernmental system and hence are constrained by its limitations -for example, formulating additional international agreements. Others require expansion of supranational decision-making and of organizations that could serve as building blocks for the construction of a global nation, but their development on the global level cannot be much accelerated as long as people's prime loyalties and sense of identity are centered around their respective nation states. I-NGOs are building blocks for a global civil society, but they are particularly unsuited fortreating transnational order-related problems.53 The mind, then, turns back to the expanded semi-empire model -an out-25 0wd1 of the anti-terrorism coalition or some future one composed along similar lines. As we have seen, it could be formed in short order because it initially would be limited to missions that many national governments have a serious interest in, would deal largely with non-state actors, and would be based on a model that, so far at least, has been effective. Whether such a coalition (despite likely changes in composition) could be made to last, and its missions much expanded, is far from a foregone conclusion, but as long as one superpower (in conjunction with some other powers) is willing to undergird the coalition with economic and military means, it might well have some staying power.
An expanded semi-empire might, ~adually, ~ow less hierarchical and more legitimate. This suggestion is more than merely an expression of optimism. Historically, ever since the advent of mass education and the development of popular media, it has become increasingly difficult to lock people out of politics. Empires have been dismantled and there have been movements in numerous parts of the world to move toward less authoritarian governments (in Russia, China, etc.) and less hierarchical global systems (especially since the end of the cold war). Indeed, even in previous eras, nations that were initially formed through the power of one state (such as Prussia in the formation of Germany) eventually democratized. The United States has ~anted non-property-holders the right to run for office, women the right to vote, and has ensured that minorities have de jure and largely de facto the right to vote. All this is not to suggest that democratization in anyone country, and surely not in any global organization, is nearly ideal. The argument is merely that, whenever empires or semiempires with broad agendas have been formed, over time they have generated pressures that have made them ~adually less hierarchical and more accountable than they were at their starting points.
I cannot stress enough that I do not advocate starting with a global semiempire and improving upon it; I merely point out that the more alarmed one is about transnational order-related problems, the more one will be inclined to consider it, despite its considerable normative failings. Moreover, there is little reason to doubt that the broader the scope of the missions the coalition took on, the more its lack of accountability and hence legitimacy would stand out, which would create forces that would work to change it. Also, many of these missions would entail not merely tackling non-state actors (backed by a very few nations, such as those that earn a good part of their income from the drug trade), but imposing order among nations or on nations to achieve goals such as preventing genocide. Such missions would directly confront the cornerstone of the old system -national sovereignty -and hence would lead to an intensified quest for new architeCtures that might provide ~eater legitimacy for some kind of a new world order. That is, a semi-empire might generate forces that would -~adually -push toward the global nation architecture. In the long run, an architecture like that of the coalition could only continue to expand its scope (especially dealing with 26 important, non-order-related transnational problems) and enhance its stability if simultaneously efforts were made to develop the kind of social and political foundations on which a global society and government could eventually rest. Although such developments could take a very long time to mature, progress in that direction -say, via changes in the membership of the UN Security Council and in the role of the UN General Assembly and via the creation of new world courts, paralleled by an increasing global normative consensus on the issues at hand54 -could move the semi-empire toward a more accountable and legitimate architecture.
Conti usion
The old, international system has been found to be inadequate for dealing with rising transnational problems. The 2001 American anti-terrorism coalition presents a new attempt to foster order in the post-cold war world. It may be characterized as a semi-empire, thin in mission, effective, but without accountability to any global body. Its legitimacy is thus limited to that provided by the nature of its mission. The quest for global architectures that are able to deal with a much broader scope of transnational problems than terrorism and that are much more accountable leads one to consider architectures that are either expected to be very slow to develop (a global nation, building on the evolution of supranational institutions and communities) or next to impossible to bring about (a world constitutional assembly leading to a world government). The mind hence turns to the possibility that the coalition may gradually expand the scope of its missions (initially, mainly to order-related ones), which seems plausible. Such an expansion might engender forces that would gradually push toward conversion to a more accountable global architecture.
Post Hoc
This article was written in December 2001. Looking at the same coalition in May 2002, it may appear that it is already waning given mounting criticism of the way in which the United States is conducting the war against terrorism and wide opposition to attacking Iraq. However, as discussed in the article, even if the coalition vanishes, it still will deserve attention, including, of course, examining why it did not stabilize and transform into a more legitimate architecture. I should add, though, that most countries continue to collaborate with the United States in the war against terrorism, including in their own territory. In addition, it is not completely obvious that, if Iraq is liberated and its weapons of mass destruction are removed, those countries now opposed to such an intervention will not welcome it after the fact, which might lead to further expansion of the scope of the missions of the coalition.
